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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CRIME
VICTIMS AS PARTICIPANTS
Douglas E. Belooft
INTRODUCTION
In deciding the constitutionality of crime victim impact state-
ments in capital sentencing hearings,1 the U.S. Supreme Court has
identified three types of victim impact information: (1) evidence of
the victim's unique personal characteristics, (2) evidence of the
crime's impact on the victim's family and community, and (3) the vic-
tim's sentencing opinion. 2 In its 1987 decision in Booth v. Maryland,
the Court banned victim impact testimony at capital sentencing pro-
ceedings as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. 3 How-
ever, the Court overruled Booth with respect to the first two types of
impact statements in its 1991 Payne v. Tennessee decision, leaving un-
clear the admissibility of victims' sentencing opinions.4
Part I of this Article examines the evolution of victims from inter-
ested parties to participants giving sentencing recommendations. Part
II examines the constitutionality of victim sentencing participation
laws and explains why crime victims' sentencing recommendations in
capital cases are constitutional.5 In Part III, this Article shows how
existing judicial procedures provide adequate constitutional safe-
guards. Finally, Part IV demonstrates how victims of capital homicide
are harmed when the law denies them the ability to recommend
sentences.
Victim participation rights obviate federal constitutional objec-
tions to victim sentencing recommendation because it is constitu-
tional to allow participants an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme
Court's holdings in Booth and Payne were based on the premise that
t Associate Professor of Law and Director, National Crime Victim Law Institute,
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Oregon. Thank you to
Lewis & Clark Law Professors Brian Blum, Ed Brunet, William Funk, Susan Mandiberg, and
Michelle Travis for reviewing earlier manuscripts. Your support, guidance, and wisdom are
much appreciated. This Article is dedicated to Collene and Gary Campbell.
I A victim who provides impact information in a homicide case is actually the homi-
cide survivor, typically a family member of the deceased.
2 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
3 See id. at 502-03, 509.
4 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 830 n.2 (1991).
5 This Article assumes that the hypothetical "participant" has "standing." Standing
issues are outside the Article's scope.
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victims testified as witnesses when giving victim impact information at
sentencing.6 However, the underlying law has changed to make crime
victims participants, rather than witnesses, at sentencing hearings.
Moreover, the underlying law has changed to grant victims the right
to give sentencing recommendations. These changes alter the consti-
tutional analysis. Now, any constitutional challenge to victim sentenc-
ing recommendations must be made against the constitutionality of
participants recommending sentences, not as witnesses giving opinions.
Such a challenge should fail. Granting the victim a participant's right
to make a sentencing recommendation is not inherently cruel and
unusual, because the legitimization of victim harm precludes Eighth
Amendment concerns, and because a "public sense of justice"7 sup-
ports it. Moreover, victim participant status does not violate due pro-
cess, because the sentencing recommendation of a participant, unlike
the recommendation of a witness, is not unfair or arbitrary. This is
because victims, like the state, are harmed by the crime. Further-
more, due process is not "evolving" to silence victims in the criminal
process. Rather, the states and Congress are moving to allow further
victim involvement in criminal proceedings. The Constitution does
not interfere with this laudable development.
I
CRIME VICTIMS Now GivE SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION
AS PARTICIPANTS, NOT AS WITNESSES
At one time in the United States, the law considered crime vic-
tims interested parties and prosecutors in criminal cases. 8 However,
in the 1900s in criminal procedure; public prosecutors dominated fel-
ony prosecution. 9 By limiting private prosecutions. with the extensive
use of public prosecutors, the states set the stage for the Court to turn
common-law victim participation on its head. In Linda tKS. v. Richard
D.,10 the U.S. Supreme Court declared that a crime victim has no
6 See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
7 Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 127-28 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)
9 See William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The
Return of the Victim, 13 Am. CRim. L. REv. 649, 649-50 (1976).
10 410 U.S. 614 (1973). In Linda RiS., the mother of an illegitimate child brought an
action to enjoin the discriminatory application of a provision in the Texas penal code that
made it a misdemeanor to willfully fail to provide support to a child. Id. at 614-15. Prior
Texas court decisions had held that illegitimate children were not protected by the statute.
Id. at 615. Therefore, the mother in Linda R.S. argued that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by unlawfully discriminating between
legitimate and illegitimate children. Id. at 616. In disposing of the mother's claim, the
Court never reached the Equal Protection Clause issue. Id. at 619 n.6. Instead, the major-
ity refused to recognize that the mother had standing to raise the claim in the first place.
Id. at 619.
20031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
'judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.""
Former Yale Law School Dean Abraham Goldstein criticized the
Linda R.S. ruling on historical grounds.1 2 He observed that "[t]he
American historical error confused the [Attorney General's] power to
intervene and dismiss cases already initiated by private parties with the
exclusive power to decide whether they should be initiated at all."13
As a result of this misunderstanding, the Court "transformed" the in-
terest in public prosecutorial review "into a rationale for total control
of the initial stage, the charge itself."' 4 While there is certainly room
for Goldstein's interpretation, it is also accurate to interpret the Linda
R.S. opinion as recognizing that state legislatures have the legitimate
authority to restrict victims' common-law participation rights in the
criminal process.' 5 Furthermore, it is reasonable to interpret Linda
R.S. as recognizing that the rise of the public prosecutor in the states
meant the end of judicially cognizable victim interests in charging.' 6
In the era of Linda R.S., while the Court was acknowledging legiti-
mate state limitations on victim participation and before the modern
advent of victim participation at sentencing, no legislation or state
constitutional rights existed that allowed the victim to give a recom-
mendation at sentencing. Given this procedural backdrop and the
particular state laws at issue, the Court correctly identified victim im-
pact statements in Booth and Payne as testimonial evidence provided by
witnesses. In Booth, the Court noted that under Maryland law, victim
impact information "may be read to the jury during the sentencing
phase, or the family members may be called to testify as to the informa-
tion." 7 In Payne, the Court noted that "[t]he [sitate presented the testi-
mony of [the victim's] mother."' 8 These descriptions clearly indicate
that the Court viewed those victims as sentencing witnesses, and not as
victims with the civil right to address the sentencing authority.
In holding that the victim's personal characteristics and the
crime's impact on the victim's family and community were constitu-
tionally admissible, the Payne majority viewed victim testimony as "sim-
ply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority
I Id.
12 See Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52
Miss. LJ. 515, 549-50 (1982).
13 Id. at 550.
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99 (1875); Commonwealth v. Benz, 565 A.2d
764 (Pa. 1989).
16 See Timothy P. O'Neill, The Good, the Bad, and the Burger Court: Victims' Rights and a
New Model of Criminal Review, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGy 363, 367-68 (1984).
17 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 499 (1987) (emphasis added), overruled by Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
18 Payne, 501 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added).
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about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a
general type long considered by sentencing authorities."1 9 Arguably,
because only the first two types of victim impact information are factu-
ally relevant "witness" testimony, 20 victims' "witness" status might be
seen as undermining the constitutionality of victims' sentencing
opinions.
Since Payne, however, crime victims' status in the criminal process
has changed. Victims are no longer witnesses providing opinion evi-
dence, but are participants with state constitutional and statutory rights
to give sentencing recommendations. In Linda RIS., the Court
pointed the way to the legitimization of victims' participation inter-
ests. It was only common-law 'judicial" legitimacy of crime victims'
interests in charging that Linda R.S. no longer recognized. The Linda
R.S. Court left no doubt that Congress could provide for crime victim
participation in the criminal process, emphasizing that "Congress may
enact statutes creating legal rights .... even though no injury would
exist without the statute."21 Although Linda R.S. specifically applies to
federal legislation, state legislatures also remain free, within the pa-
rameters of their respective constitutions, to enact statutes creating
legal rights. 22
In 1982, with the path to crime victim participation brightly illu-
minated by the Court, Goldstein argued that victims should have par-
ticipation rights at sentencing, rights that could be "conferred by the
legislature. '2 3 He endorsed a procedure to "break down the concept
of intervention into a number of litigation rights and to conclude that
a given person has one or some of these rights but not all." 24 How-
ever, Goldstein's language is inappropriate: victims are not accurately
categorized as "intervenors." Intervention is a civil procedure term,
and crime victim rights of participation are in criminal, not civil,
cases. Beyond this technicality, crime victims have a history in the
criminal process that is distinct from the history of civil intervenors. 25
19 Id. at 825.
20 See supra text accompanying note 2 (listing the three types of victim impact infor-
mation identified by the Booth Court).
21 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). This assertion remains true
despite United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 335 (10th Cir. 1997), which held that the
federal victims' rights statute did not convey standing to victims. In McVeigh, the federal
right to attend trial was merely advisory, because the government must only use its "best
efforts" to enforce those rights listed in the Victims' Rights Act. See id. Because these
federal statutory provisions are advisory, they do not actually comprise rights at all.
22 For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, citing Linda R.S. as
persuasive authority, has held that its state legislature can create legal rights by statute,
enforceable by the courts. See Leardi v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094, 1102 (Mass. 1985).
23 See Goldstein, supra note 12, at 552.
24 David Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81
HARV. L. REV. 721, 727 (1968) (quoted in Goldstein, supra note 12, at 553).
25 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, it is undesirable to carry the baggage of the civil intervenor
into criminal procedure, 26 because civil intervenors typically have full-
party status.2 7 In contrast, crime victims only have participation rights
at particular stages during the criminal process.28 Furthermore, the
defendant's due process rights, which grant the public prosecutor ex-
clusive control over all critical criminal prosecutorial decisions, limit
victim participation in felony cases.2 9 Therefore, because the term
"intervenor" leads to confusion, it is necessary to coin a new term,
"participants," in order to clearly define the status of victims in the
criminal process. The word "participant" has not previously been
used as a term of art in criminal procedure, and therefore is readily
adopted here as a new term meaning "crime victim with rights of in-
termittent participation in the criminal process."3-1
Participants now have an independent right to give sentencing
recommendations. In some form or other, a victim has a right to
speak at sentencing in all fifty states."1 Many state legislative and con-
stitutional enactments grant the victim the civil liberty to speak at sen-
tencing independently of whether any other party proffers the victim
as a witness or offers the impact information as evidence.3 2 Thus,
many states have granted victims the independent right as participants
to communicate victim impact information, including sentencing rec-
ommendations. 3" Accordingly, the return to an increased role for vic-
tims in criminal proceedings means that the law considers victims to
be participants when determining the constitutionality of victims' sen-
tencing recommendations at state capital sentencing hearings.
The constitutions or statutes of forty states either explicitly or im-
plicitly grant victims the right to give recommendations at sentenc-
ing.3' 4 Twenty-three of these states grant victims the constitutional
right to address the sentencing authority.35 Seventeen states do not
have the right in their constitutions but grant the right by statute.3 6
26 For example, civil intervention can be intervention as a matter of right or permis-
sive intervention, and there are threshold legal tests that must be satisfied before a court
will allow either type of intervention. See MICHAEL O'CONNOR, O'CONNOR'S FEDERAL
RuLES: CIVIL TRIALS 228-30 (1998).
27 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
28 These participation rights vary from state to state. See infra Appendix.
29 See infra note 73.
30 For those who prefer the use of Latin, the Latin term for "participant" is "partice?."
Some debate exists as to whether the creation of new terms using Latin is helpful or merely
makes law less accessible to all. The author has chosen English as more accessible to the
lay reader.
31 See infra Appendix.
342 See infra Appendix.
33 See infra Appendix Part I.
'44 See infra Appendix Part I.
35 See infra Appendix Part I.A.l, I.B.I, I.C.I.
36 See infra Appendix Part I.A.2, I.B.2, I.C.2.
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For example, California grants a crime victim the "right to appear,
personally or by counsel, at the sentencing proceeding and to reason-
ably express his, her, or their views concerning the crime, the person
responsible, and the need for restitution. 13 7 In People v. Stringham, the
California Court of Appeals concluded that this statute created victim
participation rights.3 8 In Stringham, a victim protested in open court
the plea bargain struck in the homicide of a family member.3 9 In up-
holding the trial court's rejection of the plea bargain, the appellate
court recognized that the right to speak at sentencing included the
right to speak at a plea bargain hearing, because sentencing is inextri-
cably connected to a plea bargain. 40 The court noted,
It would be difficult to conceive of a more absurd result than to
adopt [the convict's] construction [of the statute] which would pre-
vent a victim or next of kin from having a meaningful opportunity
to protest a plea bargain that will allow a defendant to escape the
punishment which the victim or next of kin feels is appropriate to
the crime. 4 1
Therefore, the court correctly acknowledged that victims' sentencing
recommendation was part and parcel of the victims' independent
right to address the sentencing authority.
II
PARTICIPANTS' SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS IN CAPITA.
CASES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
Both Payne and Booth proceeded on the assumption that only the
prosecution and the defense could present recommendations as to
the proper sentence in capital cases. 42 This assumption was all that
was needed to resolve those cases. But when that assumption is re-
vealed to be of limited application because victims are now considered
participants giving recommendations, then clearly Booth and Payne do
not shed much light on the constitutionality of participant sentencing
recommendations. Now that victims have participant status to speak at
sentencing, the rules of factual relevance that govern witnesses giving
opinions do not govern victims' sentencing recommendations. 4 3
37 CAL. PENAL CODE §1191.1 (West Supp. 2002).
'18 See People v. Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
39 See id. at 486-87.
40 See id. at 491-92.
41 Id. at 491.
42 Of course, in many states presentence report writers mry also make a recomnmenda-
tion. See, e.g., DEL. Cono ANN. tit. 11, § 4331(b) (2001); FiLA. STAI. ANN. § 921.231(4)
(West 2001); IDAhO CODE § 19-515(e) (Michie Supp. 2002).
4-1 Law review articles continue to misidentify the crime victim as a "witness" and his
recommendation as "opinion." See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Se-ntence
Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REv. 517 (2000). Professor Logan states, "The
first, and most fundamental, reason in support of the prohibition of sentence opinion
20031
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Clearly, the harm to the state renders appropriate the public prosecu-
tor's sentencing recommendations. Likewise, the harm to the victim
makes participant sentencing recommendations appropriate. There-
fore, because victim harm is a legitimate basis for participants' recom-
mendations, such recommendations are as constitutionally
permissible as prosecutors' sentencing recommendations.
The distinction between witness opinion and victim recommen-
dation may be better understood by analogizing criminal sentencing
recommendations to the civil "prayer for relief. '44 In civil cases, trial
court level pleadings set out the relief sought as a prayer for relief. In
criminal cases, however, there is no prayer for relief in the pleadings,
perhaps because in noncapital cases the jury is not permitted to know
the potential sentence before deciding the defendant's guilt. Instead,
the prayer for relief is delayed to the sentencing phase, when the pros-
ecutor and the defendant "pray" for a particular sentence. Essentially,
victims do the same thing when they give a sentencing recommenda-
tion, by praying for relief in the form of a particular sentence desired.
Thus, when victims (and, for that matter, prosecutors and defense at-
torneys) give sentencing recommendations, it is not "opinion" at all.
Instead, the request for a particular sentence is proper because it is a
recommendation, or in civil law parlance, a prayer for relief.
Recently, the Supreme Court embraced the legitimacy of victim
harm in the capital case of Calderon v. Thompson.45 In Calderon, the
Court addressed the seemingly endless delay in the post-conviction
process, explaining that to unsettle expectations in the execution of
moral judgment "is to inflict a profound injury to the 'powerful and
legitimate interest in punishing the guilty,' an interest shared by the State
and the victims of crime alike."46 Closely related to this interest is the
victim's interest in the imposition of an appropriate punishment.
The participant's interest in punishing may be an interest in any
or all of the legitimate purposes of punishment, and thus the sentenc-
testimony is its distinct irrelevance to capital decision making." Id. at 539. Professor Lo-
gan's identification of victims as witnesses is central to his position. He maintains that a
witness's opinion is not relevant to aggravation. Id. However, once it becomes clear that
the victim is a participant, not a witness, it becomes apparent that the victim's recommen-
dation, like the prosecutor's recommendation, is relevant to sentencing even if it is not
specifically relevant to mitigating or aggravating factors. This is because victim harm pro-
vides a basis for a sentencing recommendation,just as harm to the state allows the prosecu-
tor to make a recommendation. Moreover, a prosecutor's, defendant's, or victim's
recommendation does not need to consist of information relevant to aggravation or
mitigation.
44 Special thanks to Professor Susan Mandiberg, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis
& Clark College, for suggesting this analogy.
45 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
46 Id. at 556 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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ing recommendation may implicitly reflect a quest for moral desert,47
incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence. Victim rec-
ommendations cannot be credibly pigeonholed into any single pun-
ishment rationale. For example, an effort to define participant
recommendations as exclusively retributive fails if the victim seeks
mercy rather than death. 48 Moreover, participants may seek specific
deterrence or incapacitation to avoid future harm from the same per-
petrator, or general deterrence to prevent similar crimes by others.
The participant never controls the sentencing decision, but merely
provides another perspective to the sentencing authority. A judge or
jury still must make the ultimate punishment decision.
Because the basis for excluding victim opinion (that victims are
merely witnesses giving opinion) no longer exists in a significant ma-
jority of jurisdictions,49 any exclusion of victim recommendations
must rest on the notion that there is something inherently cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment, or violative of due process,
about crime victim participants giving sentencing recommendations in
capital cases.511 In examining the constitutionality of participant sen-
tencing recommendations in noncapital cases, no court has ever
found a constitutional violation.5' Indeed, the Court in Booth seemed
47 "Moral desert" is a term used to describe the concept ofjust desert as understood
by the founders of the United States. See RONALD J. PESTRIrO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL
LAw: PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS O- AMERICA 151-56 (2000)
(providing a persuasive argument that the concept of "moral desert" has been lost in the
contemporary debate over sentencing rationales and replaced with a much narrower con-
cept of retribution).
48 For an account of a case in which the survivor of a murder victim sought mercy for
the defendant, see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
49 See supra Part I.
50 A third constitutional objection is that a defendant's equal protection rights are
violated if a victim recommends death in Defendant A's case and another victim recom-
mends life in the factually similar case involving Defendant B. However, the Court's ac-
ceptance in Payne of factually relevant victim impact testimony essentially rejects this line of
reasoning. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
51 Every state ruling on the constitutionality of victim recommendations in noncapital
cases has held that trial court judges can hear all three types of impact evidence, see supra
text accompanying note 2, including sentencing recommendations that are in the public
interest. In Randell v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed a statute that provided
crime victims the right to address the court at sentencing by permitting a victim to
"' [r] easonably express any views concerning ... the person responsible."' 846 P.2d 278,
280 (Nev. 1993) (quoting NEV. REV. S-rAI. ANN. § 176.015(3)(b) (Michie Supp. 2001) (al-
teration in original)). The court held that the statute's language permitted victims to pro-
vide sentencing recommendations in noncapital cases. See id. In so ruling, the Nevada
court cited with approval similar cases from California and Arizona. See State v. Ross, 696
P.2d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Mockel, 276 Cal. Rptr. 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990);
People v. Sewell, 259 Cal. Rptr. 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Zikorus, 197 Cal Rptr.
509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The Idaho Supreme Court came to the same conclusion under a
similar statute, stating that the statute "[d]id not contain any limitations which would pre-
vent a victim of a crime, at sentencing, from ... making a sentencing recommendation."
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to indicate that such recommendations were constitutional.52 The
question then becomes: why should victim recommendations be
treated differently in capital cases? To be sure, the Supreme Court
has held that the fact that "death is different" justifies some differ-
ences between capital and noncapital cases.531 Nevertheless, the ques-
tion remains whether there are any salient differences in the area of
victim sentencing recommendation. There are none.
A participant's sentencing recommendation is similar to other
state procedures that ultimately impact sentencing decisions. In most
states, participants already have the right to confer with and recom-
mend to the public prosecutor whether the death penalty should be
pursued in the first place. 54 In addition, in many states participants
can formally oppose a plea bargain in capital cases.5 5 In other states, a
victim's right to speak at sentencing implicitly grants the victim the
right to oppose a plea bargain.5" Accordingly, a trial court's decision
to accept or reject a plea bargain can properly hinge upon the vic-
tim's recommendation. 57 It does not violate due process or the prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment for the prosecutor, in
deciding whether to pursue the death penalty, to consider a partici-
pant's recommendation. 58 Similarly, it is constitutional for a judge to
consider a participant's recommendation when he rejects a plea bar-
gain and instead brings a case to trial. Therefore, because a victim's
recommendation may already influence the sentence before trial,
such as during the witness's testimony, participant recommendations
at sentencing should not be considered unconstitutional. Ultimately,
the argument for unconstitutionality is based on the possibility of
prejudice to the jury;5" yet empirical evidence directly contradicts the
State v. Matteson, 851 P.2d 336, 339 (Idaho 1993); accord Ingoglia v. State, 651 A.2d 409,
414 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
52 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 n.12 (1987) (emphasizing that the deci-
sion to bar victim impact evidence in capital cases did not bar reliance on victim impact
evidence in noncapital cases), ovemded by Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
5'4 The phrase "death is differct" first appeared in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976) (plurality opinion).
54 SeeNAT'L VICTIM CTR., THr. 1996 VI-rM:s' RIGHTS SOURCEOOK: A CoNM'ITIoN AND
COMPARISON OF Vic-riMs' RliCrrs LAWS 127-52 (1996) [hereinafter Vic-rims' RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK]; see also Mckenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1537 n.25 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting
that the public prosecutor's decision to pursue the death penalty is properly influenced by
the victim's opinion)
55 See Vic'rms' Rirarrs SOURCErsOOK, supra note 54, at 233-58.
56 See, e.g., supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (describing a California Court of
Appeal's decision in People v. Stringham).
57 See sumra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
58 See McKenzie, 842 F.2d at 1537 n.25.
59 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 856 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing the majority's opinion in Payne as "serv[ing] no purpose other than to encourage ju-
rors to decide in favor of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than
their reason").
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assumption that jurors are readily influenced, much less prejudiced,
by participant recommendations. 60 Even if the empirical evidence re-
vealed that juries considered victim recommendations in reaching
particular outcomes in capital cases, such consideration does not nec-
essarily demonstrate prejudice. 6' Absent prejudice, 62 ajury's due con-
sideration of a victim's recommendation is perfectly appropriate. 63
Moreover, any judicial exclusion of participant sentencing recom-
mendations is more likely to prejudice a jury in favor of imposing a
death sentence. Silencing participant sentencing recommendations
stacks the deck in favor of the imposition of the death penalty, be-
cause a jury is likely to interpret participant silence as approval of the
death penalty. This view is strongly supported by the Booth majority
opinion, which acknowledged that "[olne can understand the grief
60 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in
South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 340 (2003) ("If the use of [victim
impact evidence] since 1991 made it substantially easier to obtain death sentences, the
post-1991 rate of death sentences per murder should have increased. We observe no such
increase .... ").
61 In addition to the inherent difficulties in formulating an empirical framework that
differentiates victims' sentencing recommendations from prejudicial impact, prejudice
must be established in the particular case at issue to have constitutional import in that case.
Cff McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (requiring proof ofjurors' racial bias in
that particular case before the defendant could avail himself of the Equal Protection
Clause).
62 For a discussion of cases examining the issue of what constitutes prejudice, see
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Negative Characterization orlDescription of Defendant, by Prose-
cutor During Summation of Criminal Trial, as Grounds for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial-Mod-
ern Cases, 88 A.L.R. 4th 8 (1991); and Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Propriety and
Preudicial Effect of Counsel's Negative Characterization or Description of Witness During Summation
of Criminal Trial-Modern Cases, 88 A.L.R. 4th 209 (1991).
63 Determining the constitutionally permissible scope of victim sentencing recom-
mendations will be an issue even after such reconmendations are generally permissible.
In many states, victims have a constitutional or statutory right to attend and observe the
trial. See VicTIMs' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 54, at 285-98. In addition to articulat-
ing facts about the deceased's characteristics and harm to the survivors, a victim should be
able to express relevant facts from the trial that support the sentencing recommendation,
including factually relevant victim impact evidence. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals ruled that in a death sentencing hearing in front of a jury, "[t]here was nothing
improper in the opinions given by the three [victim] witnesses in this case that the death
penalty was the appropriate sentence" but that the "evidence should be limited to a simple
statement of the recommended sentence without amplification." Conover v. State, 933
P.2d 904, 921 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); see also Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 891 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1997) (describing the appropriate limits for giving sentencing recommenda-
tions in capital cases). The court's view that the victim's recommendation should be "a
simple statement of the recommended sentence without amplification" is correct if by us-
ing the term "amplification," the court does not prevent the victim from relying upon
other victim impact evidence (i.e., victim characteristics and the resulting harm to survi-
vors) as a foundation for the victim's recommendation. Under Oklahoma law, victims,
unlike witnesses, have the implied independent right of participants to give a sentencing
recommendation, whether or not the defense or prosecution proffers the victim as its wit-
ness or offers the victim's recommendation. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 984.1 (West Supp. 2003).
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and anger of the family caused by the brutal murders in this case, and
there is no doubt that jurors generally are aware of these feelings. 64
Jurors' general awareness of these feelings, combined with the lack of
victim recommendations in capital cases, leads to the conclusion that
the most significant recommendations of certain participants-that
death is not an appropriate sentence-will be withheld from the sen-
tencing authority. Thus, by opposing participant recommendations,
one ensures that they will be suppressed even when they would help a
defendant. For example, in Robison v. Maynard, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the victim's
sentencing recommendation against death because it was the factually
irrelevant testimony of a witness."5 Susan Bandes has argued that "the
sorts of victim initiatives that have been successful have been those,
and only those, that advance the prosecution's own agenda, while pre-
serving the prosecution's complete freedom from third-party interfer-
ence. "66 While inaccurate as a general proposition, this observation
will prove true if participant sentencing recommendation is held
unconstitutional.
Over thirty states have constitutional amendments providing
crime victims with civil rights of participation in the criminal pro-
cess.67 The increasing legitimacy of the individual crime victim's in-
terests in the United States has significant implications for a capital
defendant's Eighth Amendment and due process claims. At the time
of the framing of the Constitution, crime victims were "interested par-
ties."'68  Furthermore, whether something is "cruel and unusual"
under the Eighth Amendment is to a significant degree determined
by the "public sense ofjustice. '69 An assessment of the public sense of
justice must account for the increased role of victims in states' crimi-
nal processes. Such an accounting should lead to the conclusion that
victim sentencing recommendations, like other types of victim impact
evidence, are constitutional. Concurring in Payne, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, found no Eighth Amend-
ment violation in factually relevant victim impact evidence, recogniz-
ing that there is "a public sense of justice keen enough that it has
found voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement. ''70 Now, more
than a decade after Payne, there exists far more evidence of the public
64 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987), ovemded by Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
65 829 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1987).
66 Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 331, 333 (footnote omitted).
("7 See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, app. A at 328-29 (listing state constitutions that give partici-
pant rights to victims).
68 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 127-28 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
69 Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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sense of justice in favor of crime victim participation in the criminal
process. This evidence exists in many state laws granting crime victims
various participant rights, including the civil right to give victim sen-
tencing recommendations. 7' Moreover, this evidence is significant for
due process analysis: if due process "evolves," then it is to some degree
forged in changing cultural and legal contexts. 72 Because crime vic-
tims already have significant rights and are increasingly included in
the criminal process, federal due process cannot credibly be said to be
"evolving" towards further exclusion of the victim. 7 3
Arguments that the content of victims' sentencing recommenda-
tions violates the Eighth Amendment are unpersuasive. As long as the
death penalty is constitutional, one cannot credibly argue that a pub-
lic prosecutor's recommendation of death is cruel and unusual. The
state is permitted to make a sentencing recommendation because the
state is harmed by the criminal act. Ultimately, the propriety of a sen-
tencing recommendation is determined by the recommender's status.
Because the victim, like the state, is harmed by crime, the victim's sta-
tus as an aggrieved person with participant rights to give a recommen-
dation (i.e., a prayer for relief and not an opinion) obviates any Eighth
Amendment concern.
One could also argue that the content of a victim's sentencing
recommendation is cruel and unusual because it is the recommenda-
tion of an individual person rather than of a state official. One could
make a similar argument against victim sentencing recommendation
using a due process analysis: victim recommendation is fundamentally
unfair and arbitrary because it comes from a harmed individual rather
71 See infra Appendix (listing state constitutional and statutory provisions granting vic-
tims participation rights in criminal proceedings). See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VIC-
TIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 642-48 (1999) (exploring the ability of victims to participate
in criminal cases).
72 SeeJoseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORy L.J. 753, 840
(2002).
7- See generally BELOOF, supra note 71, at 642-48 (describing victim participation as a
now-established value in the criminal justice process). The federal courts have already
significantly limited victim participation by finding that a defendant's due process right
requires the public prosecutor to retain crucial prosecutorial decisions in a felony case.
See, e.g., East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1995); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656,
663 (4th Cir. 1988). But a victim's sentencing recommendation does not intrude upon the
public prosecutor's authority. Nor does a victim's recommendation interfere with the sen-
tencing authority, because the jury retains complete discretion to weigh the recommenda-
tion. On a separate note, the limits of a defendant's due process claim can be seen in the
recent unsuccessful efforts to eliminate, on due process grounds, privately funded prosectI-
tors for petty offenses and privately funded prosecutors' assistance to the public prosecutor
in felony cases. See East, 55 F.3d at 1000-01 (allowing the participation of a privately
funded prosecutor in a capital murder trial); Miller, 854 F.2d at 663 (allowing the participa-
tion of a privately funded prosecution in criminal contempt proceedings); New Jersey v.
Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 486, 489-92 (D.N.J. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of private
prosecutions in misdemeanor cases).
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than the harmed state. These arguments presume that only the col-
lective harm of an entire state justifies any right of participation in the
criminal process. However, to maintain the argument that individual
victim harm is an illegitimate basis for participation rights would re-
quire the repeal of laws in all fifty states that grant participation rights
to victims. Furthermore, defining crime victim harm as illegitimate is
so profoundly contrary to the common human experience-that vic-
tims are actually harmed by criminal acts--that such a fragile fiction
will ultimately fail. The folly of delegitimizing victim harm in an effort
to end victim participation is revealed in the history of criminal proce-
dure, which begins with victims as prosecutors, then excludes victims
from the criminal process, and finally treats victims as participants
through a plethora of laws that grant victims participation, privacy,
and protection. Moreover, in Calderon, the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized victim harm as a legitimate basis for a victim's interest in
punishment.7 4
III
EXISTING JUDICIAL TOOLS PROVIDE ADEQUATE
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Because victim participants may or may not be represented by
counsel, judges should supervise the delivery of a participant recom-
mendation to the jury, review the recommendation in advance for
propriety, and instruct the jury that the victim's recommendation
(like the recommendation of the prosecutor or defendant) is a recom-
mendation only. Because many jurors erroneously view the state as the
victim's attorney, the court should instruct the jury that the prosecu-
tor represents the citizens of the state, and the victim represents him-
self. Further instructions should make clear that the
recommendations of others should not replace the jury's earnest de-
liberations and exercise of independent judgment.
In the unlikely event that an inappropriate emotional outburst
accompanies a participant's sentencing recommendation, the court
should cure it with an instruction as it would during trial. Participants
are authorized to attend trial as a matter of right in many states. 75 If,
during trial, a victim makes an inappropriate emotional outburst,
courts consider it to be harmless error when corrected by instruc-
tion. 7" The same should be true at sentencing. The potential for an
emotional outburst at sentencing is present whether or not partici-
pant recommendation is permitted because the same possibility exists
74 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998); see discussion supra note 46 and accompanying text.
75 See VICTIMS' Ric.i-n-S SOURCEBOOK, supra note 54, at 285-98.
76 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Emotional Manifestation by Victim ofFamily of Victim Dur-
ing C iminal Trial (is Ground for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 31 A.L.R. 4th 229 (1984).
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during the presentation of factually relevant victim impact testimony.
Indeed, precisely the same possibility exists when a defendant or de-
fendant's family member testifies at sentencing. In those circum-
stances, we rely on the ability of the trial judge to maintain
appropriate control over the witness and, if necessary, to call for a
brief recess, provide cautionary instructions to the jury, or take other
appropriate action.77 Participant recommendations should be han-
dled similarly. If the participant's recommendation is properly con-
tained and if juries are instructed as to the nature of participant
recommendation, then juries will not be overwhelmed. 78 Therefore,
no persuasive reason exists for excluding participant recommenda-
tions from juries.79 As the Payne majority urged, states "remain free,
in capital cases, as well as others, to devise new procedures and new
remedies to meet felt needs."8 States should remain free to allow par-
ticipants' sentencing recommendations to capital juries.
IV
VICTIMS ARE HARMED WHEN SENTENCING
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DENIED THEM
The Supreme Court, attuned to the concept of victim harm
originating in the criminal act, the potential for further harm from
the criminal process, and the inclusion of victim participation in the
states' criminal proceedings, has shown increasing respect for the le-
gitimate interests of crime victims. In Morris v. Slappy, the Court rec-
ognized that a criminal defendant's rights should not be applied in a
manner that unnecessarily harms the crime victim.8' This unneces-
sary harm occurs when courts silence victims' sentencing recommen-
dations. For example, victims who want to recommend that death is
77 See Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Disruptive Conduct of Accused in Presence offurt
(is Ground for Mistrial or Discharge offJy, 89 A.L.R. 3d 960 (1979).
78 The issue of whether victims will be prejudiced is distinct from whether the Jury
duly considers victim impact evidence and properly weighs it during deliberations. It is not
necessary to prove that victim impact does not influence juries in order to establish its
constitutional viability. Compare Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of
the Victims'Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH! L. REV. 479, 491-92 (collecting empirical evidence
that victim impact testimony has little effect on sentencing), and Eisenberg et al., supra
note 60 (same), with Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: Wmat We Know About Victim Impact
Statements, 1999 UTAi L. REV. 545, 550 ("Empirically, there is little post-Payne data on the
effects of victim impact statements on capital juries, but what there is indicates that ...
victim impact statements in capital cases do increase the likelihood of a death sentence."
(footnote omitted)), and Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Re-
straint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 246-47 (1991) (reviewing a survey ofjudges in which all
judges found impact statements to be at least somewhat effective).
79 The Supreme Court recently held that judge-imposed death is unconstitutional.
See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002) (overturning the decision in Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)).
8o Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824-25 (1991).
81 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1982).
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not appropriate are forced into an agonizing choice among bad op-
tions. The first bad option is participating in the sentencing hearing
by providing the first two types of victim impact-the deceased's char-
acteristics and the particularized harm to the survivors. According to
Payne, this option respects the murdered person as a "uniquely indi-
vidual human being."8 2 However, providing victim impact informa-
tion without giving a participant sentencing recommendation
essentially endorses the State's effort to obtain the death penalty.8 3
As a poor second option, the victim can simply refuse to partici-
pate in a sentencing hearing in which death is sought. Such refusal is
problematic because it tacitly aids the quest for death. The jury is
likely to perceive the victim's silence as acquiescence in the public
prosecutor's pursuit of capital punishment. Moreover, this option
strips victims of the ability to exercise their responsibility to the de-
ceased, because waiving participation means that victims cannot even
communicate factual harm to the sentencing authority. A procedure
which inherently encourages one type of victim (who would recom-
mend no death) to waive the right to participate in sentencing but not
another (who would recommend death) is far from ideal.
A third unsatisfactory option is for the participants to convey vic-
tim harm and characteristics in a way that covertly communicates the
victim's recommendation for or against death. The news documen-
tary program 48 Hours provided a vivid example of this option.8 4 The
defendant in a homicide brutally attacked the victim and her father, a
preacher, in the preacher's parsonage. He stabbed the preacher two
dozen times and stabbed the daughter, who survived, five times, frac-
turing her skull. The defendant's death sentencing hearings took
place three times because of error unrelated to victim impact evi-
dence. In the first two hearings, the jury sentenced the defendant to
death. Between the second and third sentencing hearings, however,
the daughter decided to oppose a death sentence. Because Florida
law prohibited crime victims from giving their opinion regarding the
appropriate punishment, the judge threatened the daughter with con-
tempt if she expressed her recommendation. Therefore, in order to
convey her recommendation that the death penalty was inappropri-
ate, the daughter
complie[d] with the letter of this edict while circumventing the
spirit. She describe[d] the crime in an emotionless, matter-of-fact
82 Payne, 501 U.S. at 818 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
83 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
84 See Tom Jicha, The Risk of Forgiveness: On 48 Hours, Mercy Raises Troubling Questions,
SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 2, 1997, at 3E. The entire factual account of
this case is taken from Mr. Jicha's column.
[Vol. 88:282
VICTIMS AS PARTICIPANTS
tone. She refer[ed] to [the murderer] as a "gentleman." Perhaps
most significantly, she manage[d] to get her feelings across when
the prosecutor ask[ed] about her job. [The daughter] sa[id] she
ha[d] several, including working for the abolition of the death
penalty.85
It is doubtful that the daughter actually thought or felt that the mur-
derer was a gentleman, or that the brutal attack on herself and her
murdered father evoked no emotion. Rather, the daughter manipu-
lated her testimony to convey her recommendation that the defen-
dant not receive the death penalty.
The ability of a victim to recommend the propriety of life over
death by presenting her victim impact statement with an emotionally
flat affect reveals the absurdity of a procedural prohibition on partici-
pant sentencing recommendations. A victim can simply suppress the
richness of factually-relevant victim impact to achieve the goal of com-
municating her feelings about the impropriety of the death sentence.
In an emotional (if not strictly factual) sense, the procedural exclu-
sion of participant sentencing recommendations encourages the vic-
tim to lie. It is a safe assumption that it is easier for those victims
seeking the death penalty to implicitly convey their recommendations
because they do not need to suppress any emotion.8 6 Therefore, the
constitutional exclusion of victim sentencing recommendations would
merely screen out those victims who are less capable of communicat-
ing their sentencing recommendations obliquely.
CONCLUSION
The states continue to reset the stage for criminal procedure by
granting constitutional and statutory rights of participation, protec-
tion, and privacy to participants. The states' reliance on victim harm
as a legitimate basis for victim rights has altered an important contex-
tual aspect of the criminal process. The exclusion of the victim from
the states' criminal processes ended judicially cognizable common-law
interests of victim participation in criminal charging. Now, the mod-
ern states' statutory and constitutional inclusion of the victim in the
criminal process sets the stage for federal constitutional accommoda-
tion of state crime victims as participants in state criminal processes,
including the right to give sentencing recommendations in capital
sentencing hearings.
In Calderon, the Supreme Court correctly opined that victims
share an interest in punishment with the state,8 7 because the victim is,
in fact, harmed. This shared interest in punishment is supported by a
85 Id.
86 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
87 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998).
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history during which the Court recognized that victims were harmed,
and were thus "interested parties" seeking punishment. 88 As Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone wrote: "In all cases the crime includes an injury: every
public offence is also a private wrong, and somewhat more; it affects
the individual . . . ." It also makes sense to allow victim sentencing
recommendations because no one represents the murdered person
other than the participant. The public prosecutor represents the
state, not the participant, and the prosecutor's recommendation on
the propriety of death may, or may not, agree with the recommenda-
tion of the participant. No one but the participant can truly, and di-
rectly, speak to the participant's "powerful and legitimate interest' ' 11
in seeing the proper sentence imposed.
Borne of the harm inflicted by the convict, many crime victims
are naturally driven both by their unique status in the case and by a
sense of profound responsibility to communicate sentencing recom-
mendations. The Supreme Court said it well: "Civilized societies with-
draw . . . from the victim . . . the enforcement of criminal laws, but
they cannot erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natu-
ral yearning to see justice done .... "' No victims possess this yearn-
ing to see justice done more profoundly, or more acutely, than capital
homicide victims. Despite the apparent constitutional validity of par-
ticipants' sentencing recommendations, it is a bitter irony for victims
that in capital cases, and only in capital cases, there remains no final
validation from the Supreme Court concerning their right to provide
sentencing recommendations.
88 See suna. note 8 and accompanying text.
89 4 WILLIAm BtACKS] ONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws oF ENG,.ANI) 5 (Special Edi-
tion Legal Classics Library 1983) (1768).
9( Calderon, 523 U.S. at 556 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
91 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).
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APPENDIX
VICTIMS' RIGHT TO GIVE A SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION
IN THE FiFi' STATE JURISDICTIONS
I. STATES ALLOWING VICTIMS AS PARTICIPANTS IN SENTENCING
A. The Right to "Be Heard," to "Speak," or to "Make a
Statement"
In this category of state constitutional and statutory laws, the pro-
visions either expressly allow victims to recommend sentences or do so
implicitly by giving victims the broad right to "be heard," to "speak,"
or to "make a statement." Courts that have ruled on these broad
rights have interpreted them to include victims' right to make sen-
tence recommendations.9 2 With such broadly worded rights of allocu-
tion, recommendation is included unless specifically excluded. 93
1. Constitutions and Corresponding Statutes
AiASKA CONST. art. I, § 24: "Crime victims ... shall have the ...
right to be allowed to be heard . . . at sentencing ......
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (a) (4): "To preserve and protect victims'
rights to justice and due process, a victim of crime has a right ... to be
heard at ... sentencing."
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b): "In all criminal prosecutions, a victim
shall have . . . the right to make a statement to the court at
sentencing ......
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-39(d) (West 2001): Prior to modify-
ing a defendant's sentence, "the sentencing court . . . shall permit
[the] victim of the crime to appear before the court ... for the pur-
pose of making a statement ....
IDAIO CONST. art. I, § 22(6): "A crime victim.., has the following
rights: To be heard . . . at ... sentencing ... "
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a) (4): "Crime victims ... shall have
the . . . right to make a statement to the court at sentencing."
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/4 (West Supp. 2002): "Crime vic-
tims shall have the . . . right to make a statement to the court at
sentencing."
KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15: "Victims of crime ... shall be entitled
to certain basic rights, including the right . . . to be heard at
sentencing ......
92 See supra note 51 (discussing these court decisions); see aLto State v. Matteson, 851
P.2d 336, 339 (Idaho 1993) ("[T]he statute does not contain any limitations which would
prevent a victim of a crime, at sentencing, from sharing the victim's opinion of the defen-
dant or making a sentencing recommendation.").
')- For a list of jurisdictions that exclude victim sentencing recommendations, see infra
Appendix Part II.
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LA. CONST. art. I, § 25: "[A] victim of crime shall have the right
to . . . be . . . heard during all critical stages of preconviction and
postconviction proceedings .... ,,94
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 47(b): "[A] victim of crime
shall have the right . . . to be heard at a criminal justice
proceeding . .. ."
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1): "Crime victims... shall have the...
right to make a statement to the court at sentencing."
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.791(3)(d) (West Supp. 2002):
"[The victim] impact statement . . . may include . . . [t]he victim's
recommendation for an appropriate disposition or sentence."
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.793 (West Supp. 2002): "The vic-
tim has the right to appear and make an oral impact statement at
the ... sentencing."
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(1): "A victim of a crime... shall have...
the right to be informed of, be present at, and make an oral or written
statement at sentencing . ... "
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2) (c): "The legislature shall provide by law
for the rights of victims of crime . . . to be . . .[h]eard at all proceed-
ings for the sentencing . . . of a convicted person after trial."
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.015(3)(b) (Michie Supp. 2001):
"[B]efore imposing sentencing, the court shall afford the victim an
opportunity to . . . [r]easonably express any views concerning the
crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime on the victim
and the need for restitution."95
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A) (7): "A victim ... shall have ... the
right to make a statement to the court at sentencing .... .
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37(1)(b): "Victims of crime ... shall be enti-
tled to the . . . right to be heard at sentencing of the accused in a
manner prescribed by law .... "
OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(1) (a): "[TIhe following rights are hereby
granted to victims ... : To be heard at the . .. sentencing .... "96
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A) (5): "To preserve and protect victims'
rights to justice and due process .... victims of crime have . . . the
right to . . . be heard at any proceeding involving a .
sentencing .... "
94 But see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 905.2 (West Supp. 2002) (allowing victim
impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings only as to the victim's characteristics and
the impact of the crime on family members and friends, and describing this impact evi-
dence as "testifying for the state").
95 The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted this statute to allow victims' sentencing
recomnendations. See Randell v. State, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (Nev. 1993).
96 But see OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(a) (2001) (limiting victim impact evidence in
capital cases to "the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the
victim's family").
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TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(d): "[V]ictims shall be entitled to
the . . .right to be heard, when relevant, at all critical stages of the
criminal justice process as defined by the General Assembly."
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (b): "[V]ictims of crime have these
rights, as defined by law: ... to be heard at important criminal justice
hearings related to the victim ......
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35: "[A] victim of crime charged as a felony
shall have the right ... to make a statement at sentencing ......
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.69.030(14) (West Supp. 2002):
"[V] ictims [and] survivors of victims... have the following rights: ...
to present a statement personally or by representation, at the sentenc-
ing hearing for felony convictions ......
WIs. CONST. art I, § 9m: "This state shall ensure that crime victims
have all of the following privileges and protections as provided by
law: . . . the opportunity to make a statement to the court at
disposition ...."
2. Statutes with No Accompanying Constitutional Provision
Ci,. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191.1 (West Supp. 2002): "The victim
of any crime.., ha[s] the right to appear, personally or by counsel, at
the sentencing proceeding and to reasonably express his [or] her...
views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the need for
restitution."9 7
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-604(3) (Michie 1999): "In all circuit
court cases, the court shall afford a fair opportunity to the victim to be
heard on the issue of the defendant's disposition, before imposing
sentence."
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-8(b) (Michie 1998): "A victim present
at sentencing in a felony or misdemeanor case shall be advised by the
court of a victim's right to make a statement concerning the crime
and the sentence."
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-5 (Michie Supp. 2001): "A victim has
the right to be heard at any proceeding involving a sentence ......
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.520 (Banks-Baldwin 2001): "[A vic-
tim's] impact statement may contain ... the victim's recommendation
for an appropriate sentence."
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1174(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2001):
"The victim must be provided the opportunity to participate at sen-
tencing by ... [mlaking a statement in open court.., or [s]ubmitting
a written statement to the court either directly or through the attor-
97 This statute has been interpreted to include the right to give opinion. See People v.
Mockel, 276 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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ney for the State . . . . The court shall consider any statement
made . . . in determining the sentence."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.038(a) (3) (West Supp. 2002): "A victim
has the right to submit an impact statement to the court at the time of
sentencing .... Statements may include.., a victim's reaction to the
proposed sentence or disposition."
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-43-33 (1999): "The victim has the right to
present an impact statement or information that concerns the crimi-
nal offense or the sentence during any entry of ... sentencing .... "
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-115(4) (a) (2001): "The court shall per-
mit the victim to present a statement concerning... the victim's opin-
ion regarding appropriate sentence."
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 651:4-a (1996): "Before a judge
sentences... any person for capital.., murder, .... the victim... may
reasonably express his views concerning the offense, the person re-
sponsible, and the need for restitution .... The judge may consider
the statements of the victim or next of kin . . .when imposing
sentence . ..."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36(n) (West Supp. 2002): "The legisla-
ture finds and declares that crime victims ... are entitled to ... make,
prior to sentencing, an in-person statement directly to the sentencing
court concerning the impact of the crime."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02(14) (Supp. 2001): "Victim impact
statement. The victim must be informed ... of the victim's right to
submit or make a written impact statement to the court in any crimi-
nal case .... This statement may include ... the victim's recommen-
dation for an appropriate sentence."
VTr. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5321(a) (2) (Supp. 2002): "The victim of
a crime has the ... right[ ] in any sentencing proceedings concerning
the person convicted of that crime ... to appear, personally, to ex-
press reasonably his or her views concerning the crime, the person
convicted, and the need for restitution."
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 7-21-102(c)(iv) (Michie 2001): "[N]otice ...
shall inform the victim that his impact statement may include ...
[t]he victim's recommendation for an appropriate disposition."
B. The Right to "Be Heard When Relevant"
In this category of cases, victims have a right to "be heard" or
"make a statement" when relevant. The sentencing recommendations
of victims, as participants, are clearly proper?' s As a result, these laws
implicitly allow victim sentencing recommendations.
98 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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1. Constitutions and Corresponding Statutes
CoLo. CONST. art. 2, § 16a: "Any person who is a victim of a crimi-
nal act ... shall have the right to be heard when relevant ... at all
critical stages of the criminal justice process."
COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5(d) (2002): "[E]ach victim of
crime shall have the ... right to be heard at any court proceeding that
involves... the sentencing.., of any person.., convicted of a crime
against such victim ......
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b): "Victims of crime or their lawful repre-
sentatives... are entitled to the right.., to be heard when relevant, at
all crucial stages of criminal proceedings . .. ."
2. Statutes with No Accompanying Constitutional Provision
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 380.50(2) (b) (McKinney Supp. 2002):
"[T]he court... shall accord the victim the right to make a statement
with regard to any matter relevant to the question of sentence."
C. The Right to Give "Impact"
This category of cases allows victims to give "impact." Because the
term impact is defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as including "opin-
ion,"9 9 it is highly probable that these laws will be interpreted to in-
clude a victim's right to give a sentencing recommendation.
1. Constitutions and Corresponding Statutes
OKIA. CONST. art. II, § 34(1): "To preserve and protect the rights
of victims to justice and due process, . . . [t]he victim . . . has a
right ... to be heard at any sentencing ....
22 OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984.1(A) (West Supp. 2003): "Each
victim . . .may present a written victim impact statement or appear
personally at the sentencing proceeding and present the statements
orally."
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23: "Before sentencing, a victim shall have the
right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetra-
tor's conduct has had upon the victim."
R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-28-4(b) (Supp. 2001): "Prior to the imposi-
tion of sentence . .. the victim of the criminal offense shall be af-
forded the opportunity to address the court regarding the impact
which the defendant's criminal conduct has had on the victim."
99 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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2. Statutes with No Accompanying Constitutional Provision
ALA. CODE § 15-23-74 (1995): "The victim has the right to present
evidence, an impact statement, or information that concerns the crim-
inal offense or the sentence during any pre-sentencing, sentencing, or
restitution proceeding."
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 4B (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002): The
statute allows victim impact, "excluding any crime for which a sen-
tence of death may be imposed."
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.03(b) (8) (Vernon Supp.
2002): This statute provides for a written impact statement that in-
cludes "any ... information, other than facts related to the commis-
sion of the offense, related to the impact of the offense on the victim."
II. STATES NOT INCLUDING VICTIMS' SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS
IN THE VICTIMS' RIGHT TO ADDRESS THE SENTENCING COURT
These laws clearly define what a victim can say and do when giv-
ing impact evidence, but do not include the right to give a sentencing
recommendation. It is likely that these limitations are in reaction to
the Supreme Court's decision in Payne."" Of course, even if the vic-
tim does not have a right to give a recommendation under these laws,
the victim may still ask the court's permission, and the judge still re-
tains the authority to listen to a victim's recommendation under his
inherent authority to hear anything relevant to sentencing. 101
A. Constitutions and Corresponding Statutes
VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A: The General Assembly is instructed to
provide victim rights, which may include "[t]he right to address the
circuit court at the time sentence is imposed."
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (Michie 2000): This statute limits vic-
tim impact to "economic loss," "physical or psychological injury," and
change in "lifestyle or familial relationships."
B. Statutes with No Accompanying Constitutional Provision
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1112(a)(1) (Michie 2001): "Before im-
posing sentence, the court shall permit the victim to present a victim
impact statement concerning the effects of the crime on the victim,
the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the manner in which
the crime was perpetrated."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4331(e) (3)-(4), (7) (2001): An impact
statement shall describe "physical injury [or] .. .any change in the
lo() 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
1() See, e.g., Mockel, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
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victim's personal welfare or familial relationships . . . [or a] ny other
information relating to the impact of the offense upon the victim."
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2(c) (1997): This statute governing capi-
tal cases limits victim impact statements to "the victim's personal char-
acteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the
victim's family, or the community."
IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.21 (West Supp. 2002): "A victim may
orally present a victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing,...
[which] shall include . . . economic loss . . . , physical injury ....
change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships... ,
[and] any other information related to the impact of the offense
upon the victim."
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.19(A) (1) (Anderson 2002): "At the
[sentencing] hearing, the offender, the prosecuting attorney, [and]
the victim ... may present information relevant to the imposition of
sentence in the case."
OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 2930.14(A) (Anderson 2002): "[T]he
court shall permit the victim of the crime ... to make a statement."
18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 11.201(5) (West Supp. 2002): "Vic-
tims of crime have the... right[ ] .... to offer prior comment on the
sentencing of a defendant ... to include the ... physical, psychologi-
cal and economic effects of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family."
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-1IA-2(b) (Michie 2000): "[T]he court
shall permit the victim ... [to make] an oral statement .... Any such
statement... shall relate solely to the facts of the case and the extent
of any injuries, financial losses and loss of earnings .... .
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE STATUTES ALLOWING VICTIM
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION IN THE DISCRETION OF THE
COURT
A. Constitutions
Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 32(2): "Crime victims ... shall have the ...
right to be ... heard at ... sentencings . . . , unless in the determina-
tion of the court the interests of justice require otherwise ... "
B. Statutes
S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 23A-27-1.1 (Michie 1998): "[T]he victim in
the discretion of the court may address the court concerning the emo-
tional, physical, and monetary impact of the defendant's crime upon
him or her, and may comment upon the sentence which may be im-
posed upon the defendant."
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